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Introduction
There is a growing debate whether and how country-level regulations of doing business
matter for aggregate performance (e.g., Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan, 2006; Djankov,
McLiesh, and Ramalho, 2006; Barseghyan, 2008; Fisman and Allende, 2010; Branstetter,
Lima, Taylor, and Venncio, 2013). In turn, empirical evidence suggests that one of the
significant drivers behind recent improvements in aggregate performance are investments
in information and communication technologies (ICT) (e.g., Ro¨ller and Waverman, 2001;
Czernich, Falck, Kretschmer, and Woessmann, 2011; Jerbashian and Kochanova, 2012;
Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh, 2005).
In this paper, we investigate how country-level regulations of business activities af-
fect industry-level investments in ICT. In order to alleviate endogeneity concerns, we use
a difference-in-differences framework in the spirit of Rajan and Zingales (1998). More
specifically, we ask whether ex ante differences in country-level regulations affect invest-
ments in ICT differently in industries that depend more on these technologies compared
to the industries that depend less. To establish our results, we use industry- and country-
level data from 14 OECD countries and the World Bank’s doing business indicators. In
particular, we focus on indicators related to starting business, registering property, get-
ting credit, protecting investors, and paying taxes.1
Our results suggest that investments in ICT decline with the number of procedures,
time, and costs required for starting a business and time required for registering property.
Investments in ICT also decline with the number of tax payments and time required for
compiling tax payments. In turn, investments increase with the strength of legal rights.
We fail to establish any systematic evidence that the monetary costs and number of
procedures required for registering property affect investments in ICT. However, we find
that they significantly reduce investments in information technologies (IT). Further, we
fail to establish any systematic evidence that minimum (paid-in) capital requirement for
starting a business and the extent of director liability for self-dealing affect investments in
ICT. We find, however, that increasing the minimum required amount of (paid-in) capital
reduces investments in software and the extent of director liability reduces investments
in communication technologies (CT).
Djankov et al. (2006) and Barseghyan (2008), among others, show that the regulations
of business activities matter for economic growth. In particular, they find that countries
with less burdensome regulations grow faster. Given that investments in ICT contribute
significantly to economic growth (see, for instance, Ro¨ller and Waverman, 2001; Jorgenson
et al., 2005), our findings suggest a possible driver behind the results of such macro-level
empirical studies. Moreover, they suggest possible policy instruments which can increase
investments in ICT and, therefore, aid and compliment policy agendas such as the Digital
1These indicators are widely used in academia and by policymakers (see for further details Djankov, 2009).
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Agenda in Europe and Europe 2020.
Primarily, this paper is related to studies which identify the impact of regulations on
investments in ICT (e.g., Gruber and Verboven, 2001; Gust and Marquez, 2004; Heli and
Kretschmer, 2005; Andonova, 2006; Andonova and Diaz-Serrano, 2009; Nardotto, Val-
letti, and Verboven, 2012; Bauer, Madden, and Morey, 2014). It is also related to studies
which analyze the impact of policies on investments and, particularly, on investments in
intangible assets (e.g., Barro, 1997; Carlin and Mayer, 2003; Claessens and Laeven, 2003).
Typically, these studies focus on particular industries and policies and find that less red-
tape and deregulation encourage investments. This paper contributes to these studies by
assessing the impact country-level regulations of doing business on industry-level invest-
ments in ICT. There is also a growing number of studies which investigate the impact of
institutions and various regulations on economic performance (e.g., Barone and Cingano,
2011; Caballero, Cowan, Engel, and Micco, 2013; Bena, Ondko, and Vourvachaki, 2011;
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001). This paper contributes to these studies to the
extent that one of the pronounced drivers of recent surge in economic performance are
the investments in ICT.
The next section offers a simple model to motivate the empirical test. The third
section offers the empirical specification, and describes the data and its sources. The
fourth section summarizes the results. The last section concludes.
Theoretical Model
A regulation, which is common to all industries, would penalize (or subsidize) investments
in information and communication technologies more in industries which depend more
on these technologies.2 To show explicitly how such an inference can hold and set the
stage for the empirical analysis, we develop a stylized deterministic model which follows
the model of Alesina, Ardagna, Nicoletti, and Schiantarelli (2005).
We consider an industry where N infinitely lived firms produce horizontally differ-
entiated goods x, indexed by j. For simplicity, let the production function of a good j
(∀j = 1, ..., N) be
xj = Ak
α
j l
1−α
j , (1)
where A > 0 is an exogenous productivity level, k is the amount of ICT capital input,
l summarizes all other inputs (e.g., labor), and α ∈ (0, 1) is output elasticity of ICT
capital. In this respect, α measures the dependence on that capital since higher α means
higher output elasticity of ICT capital.
The firms can invest and accumulate capital with a technology
k˙ = ι− δk, (2)
2This statement is essentially an analogue of the Rybczynski theorem.
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where ι is the amount of investment and the initial value of k is given and is the same for
all firms. We further assume that firms incur adjustment costs for installing the newly
created capital. Adjustment costs are in terms of the firms’ output and have the standard
quadratic form b
2
(
ι
k
)2
k, where b > 0 is adjustment cost parameter.
To capture the effect of business regulations on firms’ profits in a reduced form, we
assume that these regulations affect the revenues and the costs of the firms so that the
profits of firm j net of investment costs are
pij = (1− τx) pxjxj − wlj − (1 + τι) pιιj − (1 + τb) pxj
b
2
(
ιj
kj
)2
kj, (3)
where pxj and pι are the prices of xj and ιj, and w is the price of l. In turn, τx, τι, and
τb are the effects of regulations. For example, τx > 0 can represent business taxes, and
τι < 0 and τb < 0 can represent regulations which subsidize investments or increase their
efficiency (returns on investments).
Suppose that firms in this industry are price setters so that they could coup their
investments in ICT. Moreover, A grows at a constant rate gA. Denoting interest rate by
r and the policy affecting it by τr, the problem of the firm j is
max
pxj ,lj ,ιj
{
Vj =
∫ +∞
0
pij (t) e
−[(1+τr)r−gA]tdt
}
s.t.
(1) , (2) , (3) ,
where the initial value of A is normalized to 1. For example, τr < 0 can represent policies
which facilitate lending and reduce borrowing costs.
Using q to denote the shadow value of investments and focusing on symmetric equi-
librium, the necessary conditions for optimality are given by
w = (1− α) (1− τx)
(
1− 1
e
)
x
l
, (4)
q = (1 + τι) pι + (1 + τb) b
ι
k
, (5)
q˙ = q (1 + τr) r −
[
α (1− τx)
(
1− 1
e
)
x
k
+ (1 + τb)
b
2
( ι
k
)2
− qδ
]
, (6)
where e is the perceived elasticity of substitution, 1
e
is the Lerner index, and the price of x
goods is normalized to 1. We assume that the demand for x goods is given by a standard
CES function with an elasticity of substitution ε. In such a case, it can be shown that
e = e (ε,N), and e (ε,N) increases with ε and the number of firms N (see, for further
details, Jerbashian, 2014).
It can be shown that this system is saddle-path stable. In the steady-state we obtain
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kx
=
α (1− τx)
(
1− 1
e
)
Γ1
, (7)
and
ι
x
= (δ + gA)
k
x
, (8)
where Γ1 is given by
Γ1 = (1 + τι) pι [(1 + τr) r + δ] + (1 + τb) b (δ + gA)
[
(1 + τr) r +
1
2
(δ − gA)
]
.
To show the effect of the level of dependence α, we consider how the effects of changes
in τx, τι, τb, and τr on investments relative to output (value added) depend on α. It is
straightforward to show that the partial derivatives of ι
x
with respect to τx, τι, τb, and τr
are negative. In turn, the following holds for any of these regulations
∂
∂α
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂τm ιx
∣∣∣∣ = 1α
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂τm ιx
∣∣∣∣ ,
where subscript m = x, ι, b, r. This implies that investments in industries which have
higher dependence (α) react more to changes in regulations than in industries which
have lower dependence.
Regulations of entry costs could also affect the number of firms. If higher costs of
entry reduce the number of firms, then these costs would reduce e. In this case, the effect
of such policies can be summarized in terms of ∂
∂(1/e)
ι
x
, which is negative according to (7)
and (8). From (7) and (8) it also follows that
∂
∂α
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂ (1/e) ιx
∣∣∣∣ = 1α
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂ (1/e) ιx
∣∣∣∣ ,
which implies that the level of dependence can matter also for policies which affect costs
of entry.
For a more rigorous analysis, which shows how entry costs can affect investment
decisions for different values of α, we endogenize the perceived elasticity of substitu-
tion/number of firms. We suppose that all firms enter in the first period and entrants
break even on a zero net-value condition, V = T , where T represents entry costs. We
assume that T is proportional to k, so that T = τ¯ k.
From the standard Hamilton-Jacobi-Belman equation, V˙ = [(1 + τr) r − gA]V − pi,
it follows that in the steady-state capital gains are zero, V˙ = 0. Therefore, the zero
net-value condition is equivalent to
(1− τx)x− wl − (1 + τι) pιι− (1 + τb) b
2
( ι
k
)2
k = [(1 + τr) r − gA] τ¯ k.
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From this expression and (4), (8), it follows that[
1− (1− α)
(
1− 1
e
)]
(1− τx) x
k
= Γ2 + [(1 + τr) r − gA] τ¯ ,
where we use Γ2 to denote
Γ2 = (1 + τι) pι (δ + gA) + (1 + τb)
b
2
(δ + gA)
2 .
Further, expressing
(
1− 1
e
)
in terms of k
x
from (7) and using the expression above gives
ι
x
=
(δ + gA) (1− τx)
[(1 + τr) r − gA] τ¯ + 1−αα Γ1 + Γ2
.
It can be shown that increasing the entry cost (τ¯) reduces investments ( ι
x
), i.e., ∂
∂τ¯
ι
x
<
0. In turn, the effect of higher dependence is given by
∂
∂α
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂τ¯ ιx
∣∣∣∣ = 2 1α2 Γ1 1[(1 + τr) r − gA] τ¯ + 1−αα Γ1 + Γ2
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂τ¯ ιx
∣∣∣∣ ,
which implies that investments react more to the entry cost, τ¯ , for higher values of
dependence on ICT, α.
In case entry cost is proportional to the level of output/value added then we would
have that
ι
x
=
(δ + gA) {1− τx − [(1 + τr) r − gA] τ¯}
1−α
α
Γ1 + Γ2
.3
In this case also it can be shown that higher entry cost reduces investments. Moreover,
it can be shown that
∂
∂α
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂τ¯ ιx
∣∣∣∣ = 11−α
α
Γ1 + Γ2
1
α2
Γ1
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂τ¯ ιx
∣∣∣∣ ,
which implies, again, that investments react more to the regulation of entry, τ¯ , for higher
values of dependence on ICT, α.4
In our empirical specification we look exactly for such a disparity across industries for
regulations of business activities. Admittedly, however, our reduced form analysis of the
likely effects of regulations might not fully encompass the true effects, which might be
economy wide and not different across industries. In such a case, our empirical exercise,
which we present in the next section, can be also viewed as a test of whether industry-level
differences exist.
3Clearly, we need to assume that 1− τx − [(1 + τr) r − gA] τ¯ > 0 in order to have positive investments.
4In case when entry cost is proportional to labor force compensation similar inference holds for certain
parameter values.
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Empirical Methodology and Data
Our empirical specification tests whether ex ante differences in country-level regulations
of business activities, ex post, affect differently ICT investment in industries which de-
pend more on ICT compared to industries which depend less. Such a test has several
advantages. It permits country and industry fixed effects, which can be important for
capturing, for example, demand characteristics, as well as fixed costs of entry into in-
dustries. It does not depend on a particular country-level model of investments in ICT
capital. Therefore, we can avoid using country-level variables. Moreover, in this respect,
it does not depend on country-level drivers behind the implementation of regulations,
which alleviates the concerns of endogeneity of the regulations.
The dependent variable in this empirical exercise is the level of investment in ICT
capital relative to value added in industry i and country c in our sample. After controlling
for industry and country fixed effects, we should find that the coefficient on the interaction
between initial level of regulation implementation and industries’ dependence on ICT
capital is different from zero for regulations which affect investment decisions.
Our empirical specification is then
Investmenti,c = β1 (Industry i’s Dependence× Regulation in Country c) (9)
+β2,i + β3,c + γXi,c + εi,c,
where our focus is on the coefficient of the interaction term β1. The coefficients β2 and β3
are industry and country fixed effects, and εi,c is an error term. In line with the theoretical
model, Xi,c includes relative price of investments in ICT, interest rate (industry rate of
return on capital), and a measure of expected growth of TFP. We also include in Xi,c the
initial level of ICT capital relative to value added, which can capture potential scale effects
and path dependence. If a regulation has a positive (negative) effect on investments in
ICT then we should find that the estimate of β1 is positive (negative).
Our empirical specification does not include time dimension. Many studies of in-
vestments use time dimension and often base their inference on within-industry varia-
tion (e.g., Alesina et al., 2005). Given our research question, however, in terms of the
methodology we follow another branch in the literature, which uses within-country and
between-industry variation to assess investments and growth (e.g., Rajan and Zingales,
1998; Carlin and Mayer, 2003). In this sense our study can be thought to be complemen-
tary. Moreover, it helps us to focus on within-country and between-industry variation
because of two reasons. First, we have very limited number of time observations. Second,
our country-level business regulation variables have large variation across countries and
industry-level dependence variables have large variation across industries. However, these
variables tend to vary little over time. We describe our measures and data in detail in
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the next section.
0.1 Data and Measures
We obtain the data for country-level regulations of business activities from the World
Bank’s Doing Business database. In turn, our source of industry-level data is the EU
KLEMS database (March 2011 update of 2009 release). It provides us with data for 30
ISIC industries (ISIC rev. 3), which have aggregation level at 1- and 2-digits.5 From these
industries we exclude the industries that are expected to have a large state involvement
(public administration and defence, and compulsory social security; education) and the
telecommunications industry (64, 75, and 80 of ISIC code), limiting our sample to 27
industries. Moreover, the use of the EU KLEMS database limits our sample to 14 OECD
countries.
Admittedly, the use of data from a rather homogenous set of countries involves trade-
offs. It can eliminate the influence of various unobservable factors on our results, for
example. However, at the same time it can weaken the results from cross-country com-
parisons.
In this study, we focus on the period 2005–2007. We do so because most of the
regulation indicators in the World Bank’s Doing Business database are available from
2005 and EU KLEMS data end in 2007. Moreover, 2007 seems to be a convenient cut-off
point since it allows us to avoid incorporating data from the recent financial crisis.6
Measuring Dependence on ICT
In a country, a naive measure of an industry’s dependence on information and commu-
nication technologies (hereafter, ICT dependence) would be its share of compensation
of ICT capital out of value added. The problems with this measure can be seen from
our model assuming that firms hire ICT capital as they do labor. This measure reflects
both the supply and the demand of ICT, and distortions thereof, when we need only
the demand in order to identify technological differences. To alleviate this problem, as
in the rest of the literature following Rajan and Zingales (1998), we try to identify ICT
dependence from US data, where most likely distortions are the lowest and supply might
be treated as perfectly elastic.
Clearly, using US data we assume that the rank ordering of the share of compensation
of ICT in US industries corresponds to the rank ordering of the technological dependence
of the industries. We also assume that that rank ordering carries over to the rest of the
countries in our sample. An observation supporting the latter assumption is that the share
of compensation of ICT capital is constant in a steady state equilibrium. Therefore, much
5To our knowledge, this is the only database which contains sufficiently detailed industry-level data.
6For example, Jerbashian and Kochanova (2012) observe that consumption of communication services
exhibits strong differences between the period before financial crisis and the period of financial crisis.
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of the variation within industries may arise from shocks that would change the relative
demand for ICT capital. As long as, however, there is technological and regulatory
convergence across countries and these shocks are worldwide, the measure constructed
from US data would be a good proxy. From another perspective, if this measure is noisy,
our findings may only suffer from attenuation bias.
Our (industry-level) data for ICT capital compensation and value added have a time
span of 2005–2007. We take the ratio of these two and average the ratio over the period
2005–2007. We use this average as a measure for ICT dependence.7
Investments in ICT and Remaining Industry-level Variables
We construct the industry-level measure of ICT investment as the ratio of investments in
ICT and value added averaged over 2005–2007 period. Further, for an industry, we use
the average growth of TFP during this period to proxy for the expected TFP growth.
To measure the relative price of investments in ICT, we take the ratio of prices of
industry-level value added and investments in ICT. In turn, to measure interest rate we
use data for industry rate of return on capital. We also obtain data for ICT capital stock
and use in our analysis the ratio of this stock and value added in an industry. All these
variables are from 2005 and are predetermined from the perspective of the analysis. Table
1 summarizes these variables.
Table 1: Description of Industry-level Variables
Variable Name Description
ICT Investment ICT investment divided to value added and averaged over the period 2005–
2007.
ICT Dependence ICT capital compensation in US industries divided to value added and av-
eraged over the period 2005–2007.
KICT ICT capital divided to value added, in 2005.
pι,ICT Price of ICT investment relative to the price of value added, in 2005.
r Industry rate of return on capital, in 2005.
gA TFP growth rate averaged over the period 2005–2007.
In order to carry out separate analyses for investments in information technologies,
communication technologies, and software, we obtain data from the EU KLEMS database
and compute variables in exact analogy to the variables for aggregate ICT. We use labels
7We perform a simple ANOVA exercise for the share of ICT capital compensation in US industries for
an extended period of 2000–2007. This exercise suggests that industry-level variation accounts for 96.3
percent of the total variation.
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IT, CT, and Software, to differentiate them. Table 2 offers summary statistics of all
industry-level variables. Table 9 in Data Appendix offers correlations.
Table 2: Summary Statistics – Industry-level Variables
N Mean SD Min Max
ICT Investment 352 0.023 0.018 0.001 0.138
ICT Dependence 350 0.045 0.026 0.005 0.099
KICT 352 0.263 1.074 0.002 20.090
pι,ICT 352 0.413 0.300 0.036 3.891
IT Investment 352 0.007 0.007 0.000 0.050
IT Dependence 350 0.009 0.007 0.001 0.042
KIT 352 0.131 0.181 0.000 2.314
pι,IT 350 0.179 0.134 0.014 1.823
CT Investment 352 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.044
CT Dependence 350 0.008 0.010 0.002 0.062
KCT 352 0.082 0.852 0.000 15.995
pι,CT 348 0.646 0.237 0.086 2.245
Software Investment 352 0.012 0.012 0.000 0.109
Software Dependence 350 0.027 0.018 0.002 0.076
KSoftware 352 0.044 0.099 0.000 1.781
pι,Software 351 0.978 0.515 0.185 7.576
r 366 0.137 0.157 -0.650 1.195
gA 366 0.026 0.063 -0.448 0.512
Note: This table shows the descriptive statistics of industry-level variables. The data are from the EU KLEMS database.
See Table 1 and the main text for the descriptions of variables.
Doing Business Indicators
We use five broad categories of regulation of business activities: regulations of starting
business, property registration, getting credit, protecting investors, and paying taxes. The
data for these regulations are from the World Bank’s Doing Business database. These
data are based on studies of legal system and regulations, and surveys of lawyers. The
variables which we use, together with their descriptions, are presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Description of the Variables from the Doing Business Database
Variable Name Description
Regulations of Starting Business
Entry Procedures Number of procedures that are officially required for starting a business (out
of 100).
Entry Time Number of months (31 calendar days) necessary to complete all procedures
that are officially required for starting a business.
Entry Cost Cost of completing all procedures that are officially required for starting a
business (percentage of per capita income).
Minimum Capital Measures the amount that entrepreneurs need to deposit in a bank (or with
a notary) before registration and up to 3 months following incorporation
(percentage of per capita income).
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Table 3 – (Continued)
Variable Name Description
Regulations of Property Registration
Property Procedures Number of procedures that are legally required for registering property
transfers (out of 100).
Property Time Number of months (31 calendar days) necessary for completing all proce-
dures that are legally required for registering property transfers.
Property Cost Cost of completing all procedures that are legally required for registering
property (percentage of the property value).
Regulations of Getting Credit
Legal Rights Measures whether laws of collateral and bankruptcy provide for features
that facilitate lending (0 to 1 index).
Credit Info Measures rules affecting the access and quality of credit information avail-
able through public and/or private credit registries (0 to 1 index).
Regulations of Investor Protection
Business Disclosure Measures whether laws provide for ways of enhancing transparency of
related-party transactions (0 to 1 index).
Director Liability Measures the extent director liability for self-dealing (0 to 1 index).
Ease of Suits Measures the ability of shareholders to sue directors and officers for miscon-
duct (0 to 1 index).
Tax System
Tax Number Measures the total number of taxes and contributions paid (out of 100).
Tax Time Number of months (31 calendar days) taken to compile and pay 3 ma-
jor types of taxes and contributions: the corporate income tax, value
added/sales tax, and labor taxes.
Tax Rate Measures the amount of taxes and mandatory contributions borne by the
business (percentage of commercial profit).
According to Djankov et al. (2006), these variables are better proxies for regulation
of business activities than other usually available perceptions-based measures. In this
regard, using a sample of OECD countries, arguably, allows us to limit the possibility of
disconnect between existence and implementation of regulations.
We use observations of these variables from 2005, where available. Variables related to
regulation of investor protection and paying taxes are available from 2006. We use values
from 2006 for them.8 The use of values from 2006 may exacerbate reverse causality
concerns. However, since these variables display little variation over short periods of
8Variables related to starting business are available from 2004.
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time, most likely this is not a significant issue.9 Table 4 offers summary statistics of these
variables. In turn, Table 10 in Data Appendix offers correlations.
Table 4: Summary Statistics - Country-level Variables
Mean SD Min Max
Entry Procedures 0.071 0.028 0.030 0.110
Entry Time 0.912 0.962 0.097 3.677
Entry Cost 0.074 0.070 0.000 0.214
Minimum Capital 0.329 0.258 0.000 0.749
Property Procedures 0.046 0.013 0.020 0.060
Property Time 1.810 3.252 0.177 12.613
Property Cost 0.039 0.021 0.005 0.087
Legal Rights 0.700 0.184 0.300 1
Credit Info 0.833 0.173 0.500 1
Business Disclosure 0.550 0.238 0.200 1
Director Liability 0.529 0.182 0.200 0.900
Ease of Suits 0.679 0.137 0.400 0.900
Tax Number 0.139 0.064 0.040 0.270
Tax Time 8.806 6.672 3.387 30
Tax Rate 0.502 0.111 0.333 0.768
Note: This table shows the descriptive statistics of county-level variables. The number of observations is 14, and the data
are from the Word Bank’s Doing Business database. Variables related to investor protection and paying taxes are from
2006. The remaining variables are from 2005. See Table 3 and the main text for the descriptions of variables.
Results
The first column of Table 5 offers our main results (βˆ1) from estimation of the specification
(9). The dependent variable is ICT investment, and the interaction terms consist of the
measure of dependence on ICT and regulatory variables. Given that the dependent
variable is from the interval [0, 1], we use censored Tobit estimation method, with robust
(clustered) standard errors. Moreover, in all regressions we exclude the top and the
bottom percentiles of the dependent variable as outliers.
The results suggest that investments in ICT are lower in industries that depend more
on ICT in countries with greater number of procedures, time, and monetary cost required
for starting a business and time required for registering property. Moreover, investments
in ICT are lower in countries with greater number of tax payments and time required to
pay taxes. Investments are higher, however, in countries with legal rights systems which
facilitate lending. For the remaining regulatory variables, although the coefficients on
interaction term are not statistically significant, they tend to have plausible signs. All in
all, this evidence suggests that the costs of starting business, registering property, and
paying taxes reduce ICT investment and better legal rights systems increase it.
Since we have a difference-in-differences estimator, one way to compute the magnitude
of our results is as follows. We take the countries that rank the lowest and the top in
terms of the regulatory variables and compute the difference between the levels of these
9A simple ANOVA exercise performed on these variables suggests that country-level variation explains
82.8–99.0 percent of the total variation. In turn, time variation explains only 0–2.9 percent.
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Table 5: Regression Results for ICT Investment
Regulation
ICT Dependence×
KICT pι,ICT r gA
Max.
Regulation Effect
Entry Procedures -3.449*** (1.203) 0.001 (0.001) 0.004 (0.005) -0.011** (0.005) -0.013 (0.013) -0.026
Entry Time -0.068** (0.033) 0.001 (0.001) 0.005 (0.005) -0.011* (0.006) -0.017 (0.014) -0.023
Entry Cost -1.395*** (0.447) 0.001 (0.001) 0.005 (0.005) -0.013** (0.005) -0.015 (0.013) -0.028
Minimum Capital -0.012 (0.109) 0.001 (0.001) 0.006 (0.005) -0.011* (0.006) -0.020 (0.015) -0.001
Property Procedures -4.654 (2.955) 0.001 (0.001) 0.005 (0.005) -0.011** (0.006) -0.019 (0.014) -0.018
Property Time -0.022*** (0.005) 0.001* (0.001) 0.005 (0.005) -0.011* (0.006) -0.018 (0.014) -0.025
Property Cost -2.050 (1.674) 0.000 (0.001) 0.005 (0.005) -0.012** (0.006) -0.019 (0.015) -0.016
Legal Rights 0.277* (0.148) 0.001 (0.001) 0.006 (0.005) -0.011** (0.006) -0.018 (0.014) 0.018
Credit Info -0.067 (0.194) 0.001 (0.001) 0.005 (0.005) -0.012** (0.006) -0.020 (0.015) -0.003
Business Disclosure 0.014 (0.142) 0.001 (0.001) 0.006 (0.005) -0.011* (0.006) -0.020 (0.015) 0.001
Director Liability 0.040 (0.181) 0.001 (0.001) 0.006 (0.005) -0.011* (0.006) -0.020 (0.015) 0.003
Ease of Suits 0.219 (0.216) 0.001 (0.001) 0.006 (0.005) -0.012* (0.006) -0.019 (0.015) 0.010
Tax Number -1.308*** (0.430) 0.001 (0.001) 0.005 (0.005) -0.010* (0.006) -0.017 (0.014) -0.028
Tax Time -0.008*** (0.003) 0.001 (0.001) 0.005 (0.005) -0.011* (0.006) -0.018 (0.014) -0.021
Tax Rate -0.394 (0.271) 0.000 (0.001) 0.006 (0.005) -0.012** (0.006) -0.019 (0.015) -0.016
Note: This table reports the results from estimation of the specification (9), where the dependent variable is ICT investment.
The last column reports the maximum effects of regulations. The estimation method is Tobit with [0, 1] censoring. All
regressions include industry and country dummies. The number of observations is 350, and F-statistics vary from 13.24 to
16.51. Robust (clustered) standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level,
and * at the 10% level.
variables for them. Further, we take the industries that rank the lowest and the highest in
terms of the level of dependence on ICT and compute the difference between dependence
levels. In our sample, these industries are Real Estate Activities (lowest dependence) and
Financial Intermediation (highest dependence). Finally, we compute
βˆ1 ×∆Regulation×∆ICT Dependence,
where ∆ stands for the difference operator between the lowest and the highest levels.
The last column of Table 5 reports these effects for each regression. Focusing on statisti-
cally significant estimates of β1, the computed effects are in-between 0.018–0.028. These
numbers correspond to the effect of moving from the top country to the bottom in terms
of the doing business regulations on ICT investment (relative to value added) in highest
dependence industry relative to the lowest dependence industry. All these numbers sug-
gest that regulations of doing business have economically large and significant effects at
least relative to the mean of ICT investment which is 0.023. Admittedly, these are the
largest effects of regulations according to our estimations.
In an attempt of ruling out other explanations for our results, we perform various
robustness checks and offer the results in Appendix - Robustness Checks. Table 13
presents estimates from estimation of the specification (9) using least squares method.
In Table 14 we subtract the contribution of ICT to TFP growth from our measure of
expected growth of TFP, gA. In Table 15 we exclude the US from our estimation sample.
In Table 16, we exclude in each country the industries which have relatively high levels of
initial ICT capital. Finally, our theoretical model suggests that the level of competition
in industries can affect investment decisions. Moreover, the level of competition, in
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particular, in US industries can matter and confound our measure of ICT dependence.
We use price-cost margin (PCM) to measure the level of competition. Price-cost margin
is the empirical analogue of the Lerner index, and we define it as the ratio of total capital
compensation to output in each industry in countries of our sample. In Table 17 we
include in the specification (9) the value of price-cost margin and its square measured
in 2005. In Table 18 we include the interaction of regulatory variables with price-cost
margin in US industries averaged over the period of 2005–2007 to take into account the
possible confounding effect of competition level in US industries. In turn, in Table 19
we include the ratio of ICT capital compensation to ICT capital stock as an additional
measure of interest rate. The data for all these additional measures we obtain from the
EU KLEMS database. Our results remain virtually intact.10
Results for the Components of ICT
Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) in a growth accounting exercise show that the investments in
the components of ICT, information technologies (IT), communication technologies (CT),
and software, have varying effects on aggregate performance. In the light of this evidence,
we test whether regulations of doing business have different effects on investments in
information technologies, communication technologies, and software.
Table 6: Regression Results for IT Investment
Regulation
IT Dependence×
KIT pι,IT r gA
Max.
Regulation Effect
Entry Procedures -3.410*** (0.882) 0.013** (0.006) 0.005 (0.005) -0.001 (0.001) 0.006 (0.009) -0.011
Entry Time -0.068*** (0.026) 0.013** (0.006) 0.005 (0.005) -0.002 (0.001) 0.007 (0.009) -0.010
Entry Cost -1.832*** (0.460) 0.013** (0.006) 0.005 (0.005) -0.002 (0.001) 0.007 (0.009) -0.016
Minimum Capital -0.057 (0.113) 0.013** (0.006) 0.005 (0.005) -0.002 (0.001) 0.006 (0.009) -0.002
Property Procedures -4.158* (2.406) 0.013** (0.006) 0.005 (0.005) -0.002 (0.001) 0.006 (0.009) -0.007
Property Time -0.033** (0.015) 0.014** (0.006) 0.005 (0.005) -0.002 (0.001) 0.007 (0.009) -0.017
Property Cost -2.793** (1.164) 0.013** (0.006) 0.005 (0.005) -0.002* (0.001) 0.006 (0.010) -0.009
Legal Rights 0.384** (0.191) 0.013** (0.006) 0.005 (0.005) -0.002 (0.001) 0.006 (0.009) 0.011
Credit Info -0.116 (0.190) 0.013** (0.006) 0.005 (0.005) -0.002 (0.001) 0.006 (0.010) -0.002
Business Disclosure 0.046 (0.171) 0.013** (0.006) 0.005 (0.005) -0.002 (0.001) 0.006 (0.009) 0.001
Director Liability -0.186 (0.172) 0.013** (0.006) 0.005 (0.005) -0.002 (0.001) 0.006 (0.009) -0.005
Ease of Suits 0.243 (0.165) 0.013** (0.006) 0.005 (0.005) -0.002* (0.001) 0.006 (0.010) 0.005
Tax Number -1.871*** (0.656) 0.014** (0.006) 0.005 (0.005) -0.002 (0.001) 0.006 (0.009) -0.018
Tax Time -0.015*** (0.006) 0.014** (0.006) 0.005 (0.005) -0.002 (0.001) 0.006 (0.009) -0.017
Tax Rate -0.374 (0.265) 0.013** (0.006) 0.005 (0.005) -0.002* (0.001) 0.006 (0.010) -0.007
Note: This table reports the results from estimation of the specification (9), where the dependent variable is IT (computing
equipment) investment. The last column reports the maximum effects of regulations. The estimation method is Tobit with
[0, 1] censoring. All regressions include industry and country dummies. The number of observations is 348, and F-statistics
vary from 18.54 to 21.90. Robust (clustered) standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level,
** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
Tables 6–8 report our results from the estimations of the specification (9), where the
dependent variables are investments in information technologies (IT), communication
technologies (CT), and software, relative to value added. The interaction terms consist
10As a robustness check, we have also included in the specification (9) the share of an industry in a country
in total industrial value added.
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of business regulation variables and measures of dependence on IT, CT, and software.
Similarly to ICT dependence, we use the shares of compensation of computing equip-
ment, communications equipment, and software capital in value added in US industries
to measure dependence levels. Estimation method is Tobit with [0, 1] censoring and
robust (clustered) standard errors.
Table 7: Regression Results for CT Investment
Regulation
CT Dependence×
KCT pι,CT r gA
Max.
Regulation Effect
Entry Procedures -1.884* (0.989) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.007** (0.003) -0.009
Entry Time -0.077** (0.030) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.006** (0.003) -0.017
Entry Cost -0.867** (0.418) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.007** (0.003) -0.011
Minimum Capital -0.069 (0.079) 0.000* (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.007*** (0.003) -0.003
Property Procedures -2.323 (2.896) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.007** (0.003) -0.006
Property Time -0.009** (0.004) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.007** (0.003) -0.007
Property Cost 0.093 (1.548) 0.000* (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.007*** (0.003) 0.000
Legal Rights 0.279* (0.159) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.007** (0.003) 0.012
Credit Info -0.014 (0.130) 0.000* (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.007*** (0.003) -0.000
Business Disclosure 0.097 (0.090) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.007** (0.003) 0.005
Director Liability -0.261** (0.117) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.007** (0.003) -0.011
Ease of Suits 0.053 (0.177) 0.000* (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.007*** (0.003) 0.002
Tax Number 0.457 (0.434) 0.000* (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.008*** (0.003) 0.006
Tax Time -0.001 (0.002) 0.000* (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.007** (0.003) -0.002
Tax Rate 0.125 (0.240) 0.000* (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.007** (0.003) 0.003
Note: This table reports the results from estimation of the specification (9), where the dependent variable is CT investment.
The last column reports the maximum effects of regulations. The estimation method is Tobit with [0, 1] censoring. All
regressions include industry and country dummies. The number of observations is 346, and F-statistics vary from 6.40 to
7.65. Robust (clustered) standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level,
and * at the 10% level.
Table 8: Regression Results for Software Investment
Regulation
Soft. Dependence×
KSoftware pι,Software r gA
Max.
Regulation Effect
Entry Procedures -1.120* (0.612) 0.285*** (0.026) 0.005* (0.003) -0.001 (0.002) 0.033** (0.016) -0.007
Entry Time -0.014 (0.011) 0.287*** (0.027) 0.005* (0.003) -0.000 (0.002) 0.033** (0.016) -0.004
Entry Cost -0.301 (0.222) 0.286*** (0.026) 0.005* (0.003) -0.001 (0.003) 0.033** (0.016) -0.005
Minimum Capital -0.128** (0.057) 0.289*** (0.027) 0.005** (0.003) 0.000 (0.002) 0.035** (0.016) -0.007
Property Procedures -0.578 (1.595) 0.288*** (0.027) 0.005* (0.003) -0.000 (0.003) 0.033** (0.016) -0.002
Property Time -0.001 (0.003) 0.288*** (0.027) 0.005** (0.003) -0.000 (0.002) 0.033** (0.016) -0.001
Property Cost 0.083 (0.822) 0.289*** (0.027) 0.005** (0.003) -0.000 (0.003) 0.033** (0.016) 0.001
Legal Rights 0.054 (0.082) 0.288*** (0.027) 0.005** (0.003) -0.000 (0.002) 0.033** (0.016) 0.003
Credit Info -0.000 (0.102) 0.289*** (0.026) 0.005** (0.003) -0.000 (0.002) 0.033** (0.016) -0.000
Business Disclosure 0.052 (0.076) 0.289*** (0.027) 0.006** (0.003) -0.000 (0.003) 0.033** (0.016) 0.003
Director Liability 0.090 (0.106) 0.288*** (0.027) 0.005** (0.003) -0.000 (0.002) 0.033** (0.016) 0.005
Ease of Suits 0.148 (0.108) 0.287*** (0.027) 0.005* (0.003) -0.000 (0.003) 0.033** (0.016) 0.005
Tax Number -0.528** (0.237) 0.287*** (0.026) 0.005* (0.003) 0.000 (0.002) 0.033** (0.015) -0.009
Tax Time -0.004** (0.002) 0.288*** (0.026) 0.005* (0.003) -0.000 (0.002) 0.033** (0.016) -0.009
Tax Rate -0.101 (0.144) 0.287*** (0.027) 0.005** (0.003) -0.001 (0.002) 0.033** (0.016) -0.003
Note: This table reports the results from estimation of the specification (9), where the dependent variable is software
investment. The last column reports the maximum effects of regulations. The estimation method is Tobit with [0, 1]
censoring. All regressions include industry and country dummies. The number of observations is 349, and F-statistics vary
from 42.89 to 47.15. Robust (clustered) standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, **
at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
The results for investments in information technologies (IT), communication tech-
nologies (CT), and software, are quite similar to our results for aggregate ICT, with few
notable exceptions. Greater monetary costs and number of procedures for registering
property significantly reduce investments in information technologies. Greater liability
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of directors for self-dealing reduces investments in communication technologies. How-
ever, we fail to establish any systematic evidence that the number of tax payments and
the time required to compile taxes affect investments in communication technologies.
In turn, higher (paid-in) minimum capital requirement reduces investments in software.
However, we fail to establish any systematic evidence that the strength of legal rights
affects investments in software.11
A seemingly plausible explanation why minimum capital requirements might signifi-
cantly reduce investments in software is that entrants in more software dependent indus-
tries might be smaller in size, therefore, more affected by minimum capital requirements.
In turn, a potential explanation why director liability can reduce investments in com-
munication technologies can be that investments in these technologies, in industries that
depend more on them, are relatively large scale projects and might require risk taking.
Therefore, higher liability might scare investments. We neither have data nor intend to
test these conjectures in this paper. Admittedly, further research in this direction might
be valuable.
Conclusions
Recent empirical evidence seems to suggest that the regulations of business activities
matter for aggregate performance. Moreover, it suggests that investments in ICT signif-
icantly contribute to aggregate performance. In the light of this evidence, in this paper
we investigate how the regulations of business activities affect investments in ICT.
All in all, our results suggest that these regulations have significant and economically
sizable effects on investments in ICT. We find that reducing the number of procedures,
time, and costs required for starting business and time required for registering property
increases investments in ICT. We also find that reducing the number of tax payments,
time required for compiling tax payments, and strengthening legal rights, increases in-
vestments in ICT. Moreover, according to our results, lower monetary costs and number
of procedures required for registering property imply higher investments in information
technologies. In turn, lesser extent of director liability implies higher investments in
communication technologies, and lower minimum capital requirements imply higher in-
vestments in software.
11Similarly to the analysis of investments in ICT, we implement a range of robustness checks. These results
are available upon request from the authors.
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Appendix
Data Appendix
Table 9: Correlations - Industry-level Variables
Information and Communication Technologies
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
1 ICT Investment
2 ICT Dependence 0.45***
3 KICT 0.10* 0.12**
4 pι,ICT 0.10* 0.06 -0.11**
5 r 0.10* 0.27*** -0.04 -0.05
6 gA 0.09* 0.19*** 0.05 0.15*** 0.02
Information Technologies
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
1 IT Investment
2 IT Dependence 0.37***
3 KIT 0.60*** 0.24***
4 pι,IT 0.05 -0.01 -0.24***
5 r -0.05 0.39*** -0.04 -0.10*
6 gA 0.11** 0.16*** -0.10* 0.19*** 0.06
Communication Technologies
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
1 CT Investment
2 CT Dependence 0.15***
3 KCT 0.07 -0.01
4 pι,CT -0.05 -0.06 -0.13**
5 r -0.05 0.04 -0.06 -0.15***
6 gA -0.04 0.06 0.07 0.33*** -0.01
Software
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
1 Software Investment
2 Software Dependence 0.33***
3 KSoftware 0.82*** 0.34***
4 pι,Software 0.20*** 0.14*** -0.16***
5 r 0.05 0.20*** 0.07 -0.09*
6 gA 0.23*** 0.17*** -0.02 0.33*** -0.02
Note: This table shows the pairwise correlations between industry-level variables. The data are from the EU KLEMS
database. See Table 1 for the descriptions of variables. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and
* at the 10% level.
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Appendix - Robustness Checks
In this appendix we present results from robustness check exercises.
Table 13: Robustness Check - Least Squares Estimation
Regulation
ICT Dependence×
KICT pι,ICT r gARegulation
Entry Procedures -3.449*** (1.285) 0.001 (0.001) 0.004 (0.005) -0.011** (0.006) -0.013 (0.014)
Entry Time -0.068* (0.035) 0.001 (0.001) 0.005 (0.005) -0.011* (0.006) -0.017 (0.015)
Entry Cost -1.395*** (0.477) 0.001 (0.001) 0.005 (0.005) -0.013** (0.006) -0.015 (0.014)
Minimum Capital -0.012 (0.117) 0.001 (0.001) 0.006 (0.005) -0.011* (0.006) -0.020 (0.016)
Property Procedures -4.654 (3.156) 0.001 (0.001) 0.005 (0.006) -0.011* (0.006) -0.019 (0.015)
Property Time -0.022*** (0.005) 0.001 (0.001) 0.005 (0.005) -0.011* (0.006) -0.018 (0.015)
Property Cost -2.050 (1.788) 0.000 (0.001) 0.005 (0.005) -0.012* (0.006) -0.019 (0.016)
Legal Rights 0.277* (0.158) 0.001 (0.001) 0.006 (0.005) -0.011* (0.006) -0.018 (0.015)
Credit Info -0.067 (0.207) 0.001 (0.001) 0.005 (0.005) -0.012* (0.006) -0.020 (0.015)
Business Disclosure 0.014 (0.151) 0.001 (0.001) 0.006 (0.005) -0.011* (0.006) -0.020 (0.016)
Director Liability 0.040 (0.194) 0.001 (0.001) 0.006 (0.005) -0.011* (0.006) -0.020 (0.016)
Ease of Suits 0.219 (0.231) 0.001 (0.001) 0.006 (0.005) -0.012* (0.006) -0.019 (0.016)
Tax Number -1.308*** (0.459) 0.001 (0.001) 0.005 (0.006) -0.010 (0.006) -0.017 (0.015)
Tax Time -0.008*** (0.003) 0.001 (0.001) 0.005 (0.005) -0.011* (0.006) -0.018 (0.015)
Tax Rate -0.394 (0.290) 0.000 (0.001) 0.006 (0.005) -0.012** (0.006) -0.019 (0.016)
Note: This table reports the results from Least Squares estimation of the specification (9), where the dependent variable
is ICT investment. All regressions include industry and country dummies. The number of observations is 350, R2 varies
from 0.55 to 0.57. Robust (clustered) standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at
the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
Table 14: Robustness Check - Expected TFP Growth Without Contribution of ICT
Regulation
ICT Dependence×
KICT pι,ICT r g˜ARegulation
Entry Procedures -3.321*** (1.190) 0.001 (0.001) 0.004 (0.005) -0.011** (0.005) -0.024* (0.014)
Entry Time -0.066** (0.033) 0.001 (0.001) 0.006 (0.005) -0.011* (0.006) -0.029* (0.015)
Entry Cost -1.357*** (0.442) 0.001 (0.001) 0.005 (0.005) -0.013** (0.005) -0.027* (0.014)
Minimum Capital -0.001 (0.109) 0.001 (0.001) 0.006 (0.005) -0.011* (0.006) -0.032** (0.016)
Property Procedures -4.569 (2.925) 0.001 (0.001) 0.005 (0.005) -0.011** (0.006) -0.031** (0.015)
Property Time -0.021*** (0.005) 0.001* (0.001) 0.006 (0.005) -0.011* (0.006) -0.030** (0.015)
Property Cost -1.982 (1.662) 0.001 (0.001) 0.006 (0.005) -0.012** (0.006) -0.031* (0.016)
Legal Rights 0.267* (0.146) 0.001 (0.001) 0.006 (0.005) -0.011** (0.006) -0.030* (0.015)
Credit Info -0.063 (0.192) 0.001 (0.001) 0.006 (0.005) -0.012** (0.006) -0.032** (0.016)
Business Disclosure 0.008 (0.141) 0.001 (0.001) 0.006 (0.005) -0.011* (0.006) -0.032** (0.016)
Director Liability 0.046 (0.179) 0.001 (0.001) 0.006 (0.005) -0.011* (0.006) -0.032** (0.016)
Ease of Suits 0.209 (0.216) 0.001 (0.001) 0.006 (0.005) -0.012** (0.006) -0.031* (0.016)
Tax Number -1.281*** (0.428) 0.001 (0.001) 0.005 (0.005) -0.010* (0.006) -0.029* (0.015)
Tax Time -0.008*** (0.003) 0.001 (0.001) 0.006 (0.005) -0.011** (0.006) -0.029** (0.015)
Tax Rate -0.389 (0.267) 0.001 (0.001) 0.006 (0.005) -0.012** (0.006) -0.031** (0.016)
Note: This table reports the results from estimation of the specification (9), where the dependent variable is ICT investment.
As a robustness check, expected TFP growth (g˜A) does not include contribution of ICT. Estimation method is Tobit with
[0, 1] censoring. All regressions include industry and country dummies. Number of observations is 350, and F-statistics
vary from 13.31 to 16.41. Robust (clustered) standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level,
** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
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Table 15: Robustness Check - Sample Selection: Without the US
Regulation
ICT Dependence×
KICT pι,ICT r gARegulation
Entry Procedures -3.354*** (1.211) 0.001 (0.001) 0.003 (0.004) -0.010* (0.006) -0.011 (0.014)
Entry Time -0.059* (0.031) 0.001 (0.001) 0.004 (0.005) -0.010 (0.006) -0.015 (0.015)
Entry Cost -1.298*** (0.466) 0.001 (0.001) 0.004 (0.005) -0.011* (0.006) -0.014 (0.014)
Minimum Capital 0.051 (0.111) 0.001 (0.001) 0.004 (0.005) -0.010 (0.007) -0.018 (0.016)
Property Procedures -4.317 (2.901) 0.001 (0.001) 0.003 (0.005) -0.009 (0.006) -0.017 (0.014)
Property Time -0.019*** (0.005) 0.001* (0.001) 0.004 (0.005) -0.009 (0.007) -0.016 (0.015)
Property Cost -1.214 (1.797) 0.001 (0.001) 0.004 (0.005) -0.010 (0.006) -0.017 (0.016)
Legal Rights 0.215 (0.154) 0.001 (0.001) 0.004 (0.005) -0.010 (0.006) -0.017 (0.015)
Credit Info -0.183 (0.190) 0.000 (0.001) 0.004 (0.004) -0.010 (0.006) -0.017 (0.015)
Business Disclosure -0.029 (0.139) 0.001 (0.001) 0.004 (0.005) -0.010 (0.007) -0.018 (0.016)
Director Liability -0.189 (0.176) 0.001 (0.001) 0.004 (0.005) -0.009 (0.006) -0.016 (0.015)
Ease of Suits 0.074 (0.216) 0.001 (0.001) 0.004 (0.005) -0.010 (0.006) -0.017 (0.016)
Tax Number -1.170*** (0.421) 0.001 (0.001) 0.003 (0.005) -0.008 (0.006) -0.016 (0.016)
Tax Time -0.009*** (0.003) 0.001 (0.001) 0.004 (0.005) -0.010 (0.006) -0.015 (0.015)
Tax Rate -0.356 (0.274) 0.001 (0.001) 0.004 (0.004) -0.011* (0.006) -0.017 (0.016)
Note: This table reports the results from estimation of the specification (9), where the US is excluded from the sample, and
the dependent variable is ICT investment. The estimation method is Tobit with [0, 1] censoring. All regressions include
industry and country dummies. The number of observations is 325, and F-statistics vary from 12.95 to 16.86. Robust
(clustered) standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the
10% level.
Table 16: Robustness Check - Sample Selection: Without High KICT
Regulation
ICT Dependence×
KICT pι,ICT r gARegulation
Entry Procedures -3.773*** (1.255) 0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.004) -0.003 (0.005) -0.020 (0.013)
Entry Time -0.065** (0.030) 0.001 (0.001) 0.003 (0.004) -0.001 (0.005) -0.025* (0.014)
Entry Cost -1.350*** (0.443) 0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.004) -0.003 (0.005) -0.023* (0.013)
Minimum Capital -0.069 (0.122) 0.001 (0.001) 0.003 (0.004) -0.000 (0.006) -0.027* (0.014)
Property Procedures -5.123* (2.973) 0.001 (0.000) 0.002 (0.004) -0.002 (0.006) -0.027** (0.013)
Property Time -0.021*** (0.005) 0.001* (0.001) 0.003 (0.004) 0.000 (0.005) -0.026* (0.014)
Property Cost -2.182 (1.596) 0.000 (0.001) 0.003 (0.004) -0.001 (0.005) -0.026* (0.014)
Legal Rights 0.279* (0.160) 0.001 (0.001) 0.003 (0.004) -0.001 (0.005) -0.026* (0.014)
Credit Info -0.005 (0.187) 0.001 (0.001) 0.003 (0.004) -0.001 (0.005) -0.028* (0.014)
Business Disclosure 0.039 (0.137) 0.001 (0.001) 0.003 (0.004) -0.000 (0.006) -0.027* (0.014)
Director Liability 0.144 (0.184) 0.000 (0.001) 0.003 (0.004) -0.001 (0.006) -0.028* (0.014)
Ease of Suits 0.382 (0.234) 0.000 (0.001) 0.003 (0.004) -0.001 (0.005) -0.026* (0.015)
Tax Number -1.287*** (0.409) 0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.004) 0.001 (0.005) -0.025* (0.013)
Tax Time -0.007*** (0.003) 0.001 (0.001) 0.003 (0.004) -0.001 (0.006) -0.026* (0.013)
Tax Rate -0.331 (0.269) 0.000 (0.001) 0.003 (0.004) -0.002 (0.005) -0.027* (0.014)
Note: This table reports the results from estimation of the specification (9), where the dependent variable is ICT investment.
As a robustness check, in each country we exclude the industries which have KICT higher than the 90th percentile of KICT .
The estimation method is Tobit with [0, 1] censoring. All regressions include industry and country dummies. The number
of observations is 317, and F-statistics vary from 18.36 to 25.51. Robust (clustered) standard errors are in parentheses.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
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Table 18: Robustness Check - Competition Level in US Industries and Regulations
Regulation
ICT Dependence× PCMUS× KICT pι,ICT r gARegulation Regulation
Entry Procedures -3.339*** (1.279) 0.093 (0.150) 0.001 (0.001) 0.004 (0.005) -0.011** (0.005) -0.013 (0.013)
Entry Time -0.066* (0.034) 0.002 (0.004) 0.001 (0.001) 0.005 (0.005) -0.011* (0.006) -0.017 (0.014)
Entry Cost -1.361*** (0.473) 0.028 (0.056) 0.001 (0.001) 0.005 (0.005) -0.013** (0.006) -0.015 (0.013)
Minimum Capital -0.016 (0.114) -0.004 (0.014) 0.001 (0.001) 0.006 (0.005) -0.011* (0.006) -0.020 (0.015)
Property Procedures -4.581 (3.143) 0.063 (0.365) 0.001 (0.001) 0.004 (0.005) -0.011** (0.006) -0.019 (0.014)
Property Time -0.021*** (0.005) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001* (0.001) 0.005 (0.005) -0.011* (0.006) -0.018 (0.014)
Property Cost -1.957 (1.775) 0.081 (0.201) 0.000 (0.001) 0.005 (0.005) -0.012** (0.006) -0.019 (0.015)
Legal Rights 0.279* (0.157) 0.002 (0.020) 0.001 (0.001) 0.006 (0.005) -0.011* (0.006) -0.018 (0.014)
Credit Info -0.069 (0.207) -0.001 (0.024) 0.001 (0.001) 0.005 (0.005) -0.012** (0.006) -0.020 (0.015)
Business Disclosure 0.004 (0.151) -0.008 (0.019) 0.001 (0.001) 0.006 (0.005) -0.011* (0.006) -0.020 (0.015)
Director Liability 0.041 (0.192) 0.001 (0.021) 0.001 (0.001) 0.006 (0.005) -0.011* (0.006) -0.020 (0.015)
Ease of Suits 0.220 (0.229) 0.001 (0.023) 0.001 (0.001) 0.006 (0.005) -0.012* (0.006) -0.019 (0.015)
Tax Number -1.262*** (0.461) 0.033 (0.056) 0.001 (0.001) 0.005 (0.005) -0.010* (0.006) -0.018 (0.014)
Tax Time -0.008*** (0.003) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) 0.005 (0.005) -0.011* (0.006) -0.018 (0.014)
Tax Rate -0.395 (0.287) -0.000 (0.038) 0.000 (0.001) 0.006 (0.005) -0.012** (0.006) -0.019 (0.015)
Note: This table reports the results from estimation of the specification (9), where the dependent variable is ICT investment.
As a robustness check, we add interaction term between competition in US industries and regulations PCMUS×Regualtion
to control variables Xi,c in (9). The estimation method is Tobit with [0, 1] censoring. All regressions include industry and
country dummies. The number of observations is 350, and F-statistics vary from 12.95 to 16.72. Robust (clustered)
standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
Table 19: Robustness Check - ICT Specific Interest Rate
Regulation
ICT Dependence×
KICT pι,ICT rICT r gARegulation
Entry Procedures -3.477*** (1.198) 0.001 (0.001) 0.003 (0.005) 0.012 (0.021) -0.018 (0.012) -0.012 (0.014)
Entry Time -0.070** (0.032) 0.001 (0.001) 0.004 (0.005) 0.014 (0.023) -0.019 (0.013) -0.016 (0.015)
Entry Cost -1.435*** (0.446) 0.001 (0.001) 0.004 (0.005) 0.016 (0.022) -0.021* (0.012) -0.014 (0.014)
Minimum Capital -0.012 (0.108) 0.001 (0.001) 0.005 (0.005) 0.010 (0.022) -0.017 (0.013) -0.019 (0.015)
Property Procedures -4.679 (2.937) 0.001 (0.001) 0.004 (0.006) 0.011 (0.021) -0.017 (0.012) -0.018 (0.014)
Property Time -0.022*** (0.005) 0.001* (0.001) 0.004 (0.005) 0.012 (0.022) -0.017 (0.013) -0.017 (0.015)
Property Cost -2.126 (1.653) 0.001 (0.001) 0.004 (0.005) 0.012 (0.023) -0.018 (0.013) -0.018 (0.015)
Legal Rights 0.289** (0.141) 0.001 (0.001) 0.005 (0.005) 0.013 (0.022) -0.018 (0.013) -0.017 (0.015)
Credit Info -0.057 (0.187) 0.001 (0.001) 0.005 (0.005) 0.010 (0.022) -0.017 (0.013) -0.019 (0.015)
Business Disclosure 0.021 (0.134) 0.001 (0.001) 0.005 (0.005) 0.011 (0.022) -0.017 (0.013) -0.019 (0.015)
Director Liability 0.040 (0.177) 0.001 (0.001) 0.005 (0.005) 0.010 (0.022) -0.017 (0.013) -0.019 (0.015)
Ease of Suits 0.230 (0.213) 0.001 (0.001) 0.005 (0.005) 0.012 (0.023) -0.018 (0.013) -0.018 (0.016)
Tax Number -1.310*** (0.426) 0.001 (0.001) 0.004 (0.005) 0.011 (0.021) -0.015 (0.012) -0.016 (0.015)
Tax Time -0.008*** (0.003) 0.001 (0.001) 0.004 (0.005) 0.011 (0.022) -0.017 (0.013) -0.017 (0.015)
Tax Rate -0.395 (0.270) 0.001 (0.001) 0.005 (0.005) 0.011 (0.022) -0.018 (0.013) -0.019 (0.016)
Note: This table reports the results from estimation of the specification (9), where the dependent variable is ICT investment.
As a robustness check, we add ICT specific interest rate to control variables Xi,c in (9). We define this interest rate as the
ratio of ICT capital compensation and the stock of ICT capital. The estimation method is Tobit with [0, 1] censoring. All
regressions include industry and country dummies. The number of observations is 350, and F-statistics vary from 12.82 to
15.67. Robust (clustered) standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level,
and * at the 10% level.
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